

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY  
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON

*ELECTRONICALLY FILED*

CIVIL ACTION NO. \_\_\_\_\_

**MOTHER DOE I, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS  
PARENT AND GUARDIAN FOR MINOR O.G.;**

**MOTHER DOE II AND FATHER DOE II,  
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND  
GUARDIANS FOR MINOR R.M.;**

**MOTHER DOE III AND FATHER DOE III,  
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND  
GUARDIANS FOR MINOR M.R.;**

**MOTHER DOE IV AND FATHER DOE IV,  
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND  
GUARDIANS FOR MINOR A.M.;**

**MOTHER DOE V, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS  
PARENT AND GUARDIAN FOR MINOR S.M.;**

**MOTHER DOE X AND FATHER DOE X,  
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS THE PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF  
MINOR JOHN DOE X;**

**MINORS JOHN DOES 1-10,000 (OR  
GUARDIAN AD LITEM);**

**MOTHER DOES 1-10,000;**

**FATHER DOES 1-10,000; AND**

**MOTHER ROES 1-1000 AND FATHER ROES  
1-1000, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SURVIVORS  
OF DECEASED CHILDREN**

**PLAINTIFFS**

**v.**

**SHEIKH HAMDAN BIN RASHID AL MAKTOUM,**

**ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  
CALLED HEREIN MOES 1-500**

**DEFENDANTS**

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

## **INTRODUCTION**

This Complaint seeks redress against individuals who abducted and trafficked thousands of small boys from South Asia and Africa to the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states and enslaved them to work as camel jockeys, camel trainers and camel tenders in the desolation and heat of the Arabian Peninsula. Boys as young as two years old were stolen from their parents, trafficked to foreign lands, and put under the watch of brutal overseers in camel camps throughout the region. These claims are brought to punish the perpetrators and compensate the victims of child slavery and an international slave trade in small children that seems unimaginable in the 21st century.

Camel racing has been a favored Arab pastime for centuries. As wealth grew in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula, camel racing grew and took on the trappings of an established sport patronized by the richest and most powerful sheikhs. So that their camels could run faster and enter into training at a younger age, the sheikhs began using small boys as jockeys and training riders. Despite the eventual enactment of legal weight and age limits, child jockeys weighing less than 20 kilograms, or 44 pounds, and usually between four years old and adolescence, became and remained the standard in races for much of the past thirty years. Boys as young as three years old were used in training to accustom juvenile camels to carry a rider, and were at the same time trained themselves to be jockeys.

There was a ready source of slaves and a tradition of slavery in the region until very recent times. Saudi Arabia did not outlaw slavery until 1962, and although the British made the trade illicit in its protectorates, including the modern-day United Arab Emirates, the illicit slave trade persisted there throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Because camel racing is extremely dangerous and arduous, especially for children, the Arab sheikhs would not make their own

children jockeys and trainers. The sheikhs instead bought boys who had been abducted and trafficked across international boundaries, and enslaved as young as two years old. The wealthy elite of the United Arab Emirates, including representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al Maktoum (hereinafter “Sheikh Hamdan”), were the most active participants in the sport in terms of the numbers of camels that they owned and raced and the numbers of boys they enslaved to care for, train and race their camels. As makers of the *de facto* rules of the sport, as hosts of the camel races, and with the knowledge that the source of child camel jockeys was the illicit slave trade, these elite sheikhs of the United Arab Emirates caused the enslavement of boys by other sheikhs, as well as conspired with them to enslave boys. A vast conspiracy flourished amongst all the camel owners participating in the sport to buy boys in the slave trade, hold them in bondage in brutal camps in the desert while extracting their labor to care for and exercise the camels, and then race against each other on race days. Because one cannot hold a camel race without competitors also bringing their own jockeys, the use of enslaved boys by the elite necessarily caused others to do the same.

In its *Trafficking in Persons Report* issued June 2005, the United States Department of State condemned the practice of wealthy Gulf-state sheikhs, including the Defendants, enslaving boys trafficked in the slave trade. The State Department minces no words in calling the practice “slavery”. In a section about the camel jockeys, it provided a picture of boys riding camels, with the caption, “Children trafficked to the Gulf states in the Middle East are forced to race camels for the entertainment of the elite. These children were training under the shadow of Dubai’s skyline in early 2005.” *Trafficking in Persons Report* at 12.

The 2005 Report further states:

The trafficking and exploitation of South Asian and African children as camel jockeys has burgeoned in the Gulf states, which with the discovery of oil and associated surge in wealth, transformed camel racing from a traditional Bedouin

sports pastime to a multi-million dollar activity. Today, thousands of children, some as young as three or four years of age, are trafficked from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and countries in East Africa, and sold into slavery to serve as camel jockeys.

These children live in an oppressive environment and endure harsh living conditions. They work long hours in temperatures exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit, live in unsanitary conditions, receive little food, and are deprived of sleep so that they do not gain weight and increase the load on the camels they race. They are trained and kept under the watchful eyes of handlers, who employ abusive control tactics, including threats and beatings. Some are reportedly abused sexually. Many have been seriously injured and some have been trampled to death by camels. Those who survive the harsh conditions are disposed of once they reach their teenage years. Having gained no productive skills or education, scarred with physical and psychological trauma that can last a lifetime, these children face dim prospects. They often end up leading destitute lives. Trafficked child camel jockeys are robbed of their childhoods—and of their future.

This lawsuit is brought by the boys and/or the legal guardians of the boys who were enslaved, and is brought against the individual slave-owners of the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf nations who directly, through agents and in conspiracy with and as accessories to others, perpetrated one of the greatest humanitarian crimes of the last 50 years. The Defendants robbed parents of their children, and boys of their childhoods, their futures, and sometimes their lives, for the craven purposes of entertainment and financial gain.

As a proximate result of Defendants' acts, representative Plaintiffs O.G., R.M., M.R., A.M, S.M. and similarly situated John Does 1-10,000, who are all minors who were trafficked into the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf states and enslaved as camel jockeys, were victims of torts committed in violation of the law of nations in the form of slavery, the slave trade, and human trafficking. Plaintiffs, Mother Does 1-10,000 and Father Does 1-10,000 suffered the loss of the society of their children. Mother Roes 1-1000 and Father Roes 1-1000 suffered the loss of their children.

Defendants Moe 1-500 were accomplices with, aided and abetted by, agents of, and/or co-conspirators with representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan and with each other, in the

trafficking of, enslavement of, and slave trade perpetrated against O.G., R.M., M.R., A.M., S.M. and John Does 1-10,000.

Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for the harm they have suffered due to Defendants' actions.

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

1. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Alien Tort Statute), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). This Court further has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

2. The Defendants have purposefully directed their activities within the United States making them subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts and the laws of the United States.

3. These purposeful contacts with the United States include but are not limited to:

- a. Personal involvement in corporations and LLCs beneficially held for them with billions of dollars of U.S. assets and millions of dollars in Kentucky-based assets;
- b. Personal involvement in corporations and LLCs beneficially held for them that are registered to conduct business in Kentucky;
- c. Personally overseeing and directing large purchases and sales of billions of dollars of U.S. assets, including millions of dollars of assets in Kentucky;
- d. Personally visiting the United States, and specifically Kentucky, in a non-official capacity both for pleasure and in operating their extensive businesses here;

- e. Owning multiple residences and hundreds of millions of dollars in investment real estate in the U.S., including in Kentucky; and
- f. Employing hundreds of people in the United States, and personally managing and directing those employees, including agents and employees in Kentucky.

4. There is no venue outside the United States in which the Plaintiffs can possibly obtain redress for being trafficked internationally and enslaved by the Defendants.

5. The Plaintiffs have no recourse in the United Arab Emirates, to which the boys were trafficked and where the boys were enslaved.

6. Although both employing child slaves and employing children as camel jockeys were at all times relevant to this complaint illegal in the United Arab Emirates, according to the United States Department of State, “those who own racing camels and employ the children come from powerful local families that are in effect above the law.” See *Country Reports on Human Rights for 1999, United Arab Emirates*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 2000.

7. The Maktoum family, to which Defendant Sheikh Hamdan belongs, along with other elite families that participated in the enslavement of the Plaintiffs, are in effect above the law not only in Dubai but throughout in the United Arab Emirates. Thus, the United Arab Emirates cannot provide a venue for this action.

8. There is no forum in international courts or otherwise for the Plaintiffs to obtain compensation from the Defendants.

9. Venue is proper in Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which provides that, “An alien may be sued in any district.” Upon information and belief, all Defendants, including representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, are aliens.

## PARTIES

### PLAINTIFFS – CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

10. The Plaintiffs specifically named below (the “Class Representatives”) bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons and entities defined as follows:

**The following persons shall be members of the class: (1) all minors or legal guardians and/or parents of minors who were abducted from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan, or other South Asian or African countries and trafficked into the United Arab Emirates to be enslaved in the camel-racing industry including as camel trainers, as camel tenders and/or as camel jockeys by the named Defendants, their agents or their co-conspirators in the camel-racing industry; (2) all minors or legal guardians and/or parents of minors who were induced to travel to the United Arab Emirates from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan, or other South Asian or African countries who were enslaved in the camel-racing industry including as camel trainers, as camel tenders and/or as camel jockeys by the named Defendants, their agents or their co-conspirators in the camel-racing industry.**

11. All members of the Class defined in the preceding paragraph are hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Class”.

12. Numerosity: The members of the Class are so numerous that their joinder would be impracticable in that:

- (a) The Class includes victims that potentially number in excess of 30,000 individuals;
- (b) It would be highly impractical and a waste of judicial resources for each of the approximately 30,000 individuals to be individually represented in separate actions or a single action; and

- (c) Each of the putative Class members seek to recover damages based upon the common conduct of the Defendants.

13. Commonality of Factual and Legal Questions: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (a) Whether the Defendants are liable to the Class members for violations of the law of nations giving rise to jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute;
- (b) Whether the Defendants individually and/or through their agents or co-conspirators enslaved the Class members in violations of the law of nations;
- (c) Whether the Defendants, individually and/or through their agents and co-conspirators, forced the Class members to labor against their will;
- (d) Whether damages alleged by the Class members were proximately caused by the conduct of the Defendants individually and/or through their agents and co-conspirators;
- (e) Whether the Defendants are liable to the Class members for damages for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium;
- (f) Whether the Defendants are liable to the Class members for punitive damages;  
and
- (g) What is the proper method of calculating damages for members of the Class.

14. Typicality: The claims of the Class Representatives are typical of the claims of all members of the Class in that:

- (a) The Class Representatives suffered damages as the result of common conduct and acts of the Defendants;

- (b) The Class Representatives were enslaved as a result of acts of the Defendants;
- (c) The Class Representatives were corporally punished as slaves as a result of the acts of the Defendants;
- (d) The Class Representatives were deprived of the companionship of their family members (who are also class members), education, and common standards of decency as a result of the acts of the Defendants;
- (e) Defendants used identical instruments, methods and plans to inflict harm upon the Class Representatives and all other members of the Class;
- (f) The method used to compute compensatory damages will be identical for the Class Representatives and all other members of the Class; and
- (g) Punitive damages should be awarded against the Defendants for singular acts that impacted the Class Representatives and all other members of the Class.

15. Adequacy of Class Representatives: The Class Representatives are adequate representatives of the Class in that:

- (a) The Class Representatives and all other members of Class have a unity in interest in bringing this action against the Defendants;
- (b) The Class Representatives have made provision for adequate financial resources to be available for the conduct of this litigation in order to ensure that the interests of the members of the Class will not be harmed; and
- (c) Members of the Class will be adequately represented by the Class Representatives and their Counsel who are experienced in class action litigation.

16. Predominance of Common Issues and Efficiency of Class Treatment: The common issues of fact and law enumerated above predominate over any individual factual or legal issues, and a Class Action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of those issues in that:

- (a) Individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the burden and expense to all parties and to the court system;
- (b) By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court; and
- (c) The claims of the Class Representatives and each Class Plaintiff as set forth above shall be governed by either federal law or substantially identical state law.

#### **CLASS REPRESENTATIVES**

17. **Plaintiff Mother Doe I** brings this action individually and as parent and guardian of **O.G.** for damages she and her son suffered due to O.G., at the age of approximately five years, being abducted by ruse, trafficked internationally, and sold into slavery to work as a camel jockey and camel camp worker for Defendant Sheikh Hamdan.

18. **Plaintiffs Mother Doe II and Father Doe II** bring this action individually and as parents and guardians of **R.M.** for damages they and their son suffered due to R.M., at the age of two years, being forcibly abducted, trafficked internationally, and sold into slavery as a camel jockey and camel camp worker for Defendant Sheikh Hamdan's brother, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates.

19. **Plaintiffs Mother Doe III and Father Doe III** bring this action individually and as parents and guardians of **M.R.** for damages they and their son suffered due to M.R., at the age of approximately five or six years, being forcibly abducted, trafficked internationally, and sold into slavery as a camel jockey and camel camp worker for Defendant Sheikh Hamdan's brother, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates.

20. **Plaintiffs Mother Doe IV and Father Doe IV** bring this action individually and as parents and guardians of **A.M.** for damages they and their son suffered due to A.M., at the age of six years, being abducted by ruse, trafficked internationally, and sold into slavery as a camel jockey and camel camp worker. A.M. was forcibly held and used collectively and passed around as chattel by multiple sheikhs including non-parties Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan. A.M. had been bought on a five- to seven-year contract by Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan, because of his talents as a jockey, he was lent to work for other sheikhs whose identities are unknown at the present time.

21. **Plaintiff Mother Doe V** brings this action individually and as parent and guardian of **S.M.** for damages she and her son suffered due to S.M., at the age of about six years, being forcibly abducted, trafficked internationally, and sold into slavery to work as a camel jockey and camel camp worker for Saleh bin Saef (phonetic) and his trainer, Tayuf (phonetic). Representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan was a co-conspirator and accomplice in the camel-racing sport with Saleh bin Saef, and thereby caused the injuries suffered by S.M. and his mother.

22. **Plaintiffs John Does 1-10,000** are the boys and/or the parents or guardians of boys who, like the representative Plaintiffs, were trafficked and enslaved in the United Arab

Emirates by Defendants, including representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan and/or the others who enslaved boys for camel racing and who were co-conspirators and accomplices with the representative Defendant in perpetrating the system of slavery and camel camps and the staging of camel races using the trafficked, enslaved boys.

23. **Plaintiffs Mother Roes 1-1000 and Father Roes 1-1000** are the parents and/or guardians of boys who died as a result of being trafficked and enslaved in the United Arab Emirates by Defendants, including representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan and/or the others who enslaved boys for camel racing and who were co-conspirators and accomplices with the representative Defendant in perpetrating the system of slavery and camel camps and the staging of camel races using the trafficked, enslaved boys.

#### **DEFENDANTS**

24. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates who, personally and through corporations and LLCs beneficially held on his behalf, owns businesses and residences throughout the United States.

25. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan is the current Minister of Finance and Industry of the United Arab Emirates.

26. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan travels freely throughout the world in a personal Boeing 747 aircraft including to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan possesses vast financial resources, can defend this action in any district in the United States, and has personal contacts with both the United States as a whole and with this jurisdiction in particular.

27. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan is among the largest investors in the equine industry in the United States. Upon information and belief, he maintains hundreds of horses at farms in Lexington, Kentucky.

28. Sheikh Hamdan's 2006 Belmont Stakes winner Jazil will stand the 2008 breeding season at Shadwell Farm in Lexington, Kentucky. Upon the announcement of Jazil's retirement, Shadwell Vice President and General Manager Rick Nichols stated, "After discussion with Sheikh Hamdan, we felt it in the best interest of the horse to retire him, not risking further injuries."

29. Sheikh Hamdan's two-time Horse of the Year Invasor will also stand the 2008 breeding season at Shadwell Farm in Lexington, Kentucky.

30. Sheikh Hamdan has purchased hundreds of millions of dollars of livestock over the past fifteen years in the United States. To effectuate these purchases, he often personally attends auctions and personally bids on horses in the United States. Sheikh Hamdan has been a fixture at the Keeneland Thoroughbred sales in Lexington, Kentucky since the 1980's often attending the Sales with his brother, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. The Maktoums are the biggest buyers in the Keeneland Sales' history.

31. At the Keeneland Yearling Sale in Lexington, Kentucky, in September 2006, Defendant Sheikh Hamdan personally attended the auction, bid on, and bought over \$10 million in horses.

32. Sheikh Hamdan annually spends some part of the year in Kentucky where he surveys his land and livestock holdings and conducts extensive business. When in Kentucky, he often resides at Gainsborough Farm, owned by his brother Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum.

33. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan's U.S. breeding and racing operation is Shadwell Farms, LLC of 4600 Ft. Springs Road, Lexington, Kentucky 40513. Also and alternatively, Sheikh Hamdan performs actions on behalf of that corporation in the United States. Shadwell was incorporated in Kentucky on November 30, 1998 and operated under the assumed names of Erhaab Stud, Nashwan Stud, Shadayid Stud, Shadwell Stable and the previous name of Shadwell Interim, Llc. Woodford County, Kentucky property records indicate Shadwell Farms owns six other properties in that county.

34. In December 1996, Shadwell Farms was certified to operate in Florida and has maintained this certification until the present.

35. Upon information and belief, Defendant Sheikh Hamdan employs dozens of people in the United States exclusive of personal staff attending to his needs when he is resident within the United States.

36. Defendants Moes 1-500 are as of yet unknown and their contacts with the United States are as of yet unknown. Upon information and belief, Defendant Moes 1-500 are citizens of various nations likely including the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others, and also including other nations such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sudan.

37. Plaintiffs are not currently aware of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as Moes 1-500, inclusive, and therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names and capacities. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege, that each fictitiously named Defendant is responsible in some manner for the actions herein alleged

and that the injuries to Plaintiffs herein alleged were proximately caused by the conduct of such Defendants acting in concert with one another.

### **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

38. Defendants participated in, directed and/or authorized the tortious conduct resulting from the unlawful conspiracy to enslave or perpetrate the crime of slavery and the slave trade.

39. The Defendants' actions violated international law, were carried out in their individual capacity, and were completely outside the scope of their duties as any officer of a corporation or any official of any government.

40. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the slave trade, slavery, and forced child labor constituted violations of the law of nations.

41. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that at all times herein material each of the Defendants was the agent and/or employee of and/or joint venturer or working in concert with, his/her co-Defendants and was acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment and/or joint venture or concerted activity. To the extent that said conduct was perpetrated by certain Defendants, the remaining Defendant or Defendants confirmed and ratified the same.

42. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that at all times herein material, each Defendant conspired with his/her co-Defendants by entering into an agreement to commit wrongful and tortious acts contained herein and each Defendant participated in or committed a wrongful act in furtherance of said conspiracy which resulted in injury to the Plaintiffs.

43. Whenever and wherever reference is made in this complaint to any conduct by Defendant or Defendants, such allegations and references shall also be deemed to mean the conduct of each of the Defendants, acting individually, jointly and severally.

44. Whenever and wherever reference is made to individuals who are not named as Defendants in this complaint, but who were employees/agents of Defendants, such individuals at all relevant times acted on behalf of Defendants named in this complaint within the scope of their respective employments.

45. The acts described herein were inflicted deliberately and intentionally.

46. In the alternative, Defendants aided and abetted, intentionally facilitated, and/or recklessly disregarded a violation of international law, to wit, slavery, the slave trade and forced child labor, by directly or indirectly providing support and funding to others with the intention or knowledge that those funds would be used to carry out an offense in violation of international law.

47. The acts of aiding and abetting described herein included giving knowing practical assistance or encouragement that had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the torts alleged herein.

48. Further, Defendants had knowledge that their actions would assist in the commission of the offences alleged herein.

49. The concept of complicit liability for conspiracy or aiding and abetting is well developed in customary international law. Under customary international law, one is responsible for a crime that is committed when that party provides the aforementioned knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.

50. The acts and injuries to Plaintiffs and their next-of-kin described herein were part of a pattern and practice of systematic human rights violations designed, ordered, implemented and/or directed by Defendants and their agents.

51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer physical injuries, pain and suffering, and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress; Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur medical expenses; and Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of their means of economic support. Plaintiffs are thereby entitled to general and compensatory damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

52. The conduct of Defendants and each of them, including Moes 1-500, and/or their agents/employees, as described herein, was malicious, fraudulent and/or oppressive and done with a willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiffs' rights and for the deleterious consequences of Defendants' actions. Consequently, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages from each of the Defendants.

53. Plaintiffs' causes of action arise under and violate the following laws, agreements, conventions, resolutions and treaties:

- (a) Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350;
- (b) Customary international law;
- (c) United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153 (1945);
- (d) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(iii), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
- (e) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2220A(XXI), 21 U.N. Doc., GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);

(f) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. Doc., GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976);

(g) Slavery Convention, concluded Sept. 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 788. 60 I.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927);

(h) Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, done Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1953);

(i) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (entered into force April 30, 1957);

(j) International Labour Organisation Convention No. 29 Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor (1930), adopted June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932);

(k) International Labour Organisation Convention No. 105 Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention;

(l) Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (World Conference on Human Rights, 1993);

(m) Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force September 2, 1990);

(n) Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (entered into force January 18, 2002);

(o) Common law of the United States of America;

(p) Statutes and common law of the State of Kentucky, including but not limited to wrongful death, assault and battery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, negligence, recklessness,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and recklessness;

(q) the laws of the United Arab Emirates and other countries to which the boys were trafficked and where they were enslaved;

(r) the laws of countries through which the boys were trafficked;

(s) the laws of Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Sudan and Mauritania, and any other country from which the boys were abducted.

### **FACTS OF THE CASE**

54. Due to his enormous wealth, Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, together with his brother Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum and other sheikhs from the United Arab Emirates, were able to become major participants in Thoroughbred horse racing, amongst many other expensive pursuits. Their horse racing enterprise is one of the largest in the world.

55. Representative Defendant Sheikh Hamdan's interests in sports and sporting extend to the traditional sports of the United Arab Emirates, including camel racing.

56. Camels, like horses, run faster when they carry less weight. Because of this, in or around the 1970s or 1980s, the sheikhs of the United Arab Emirates, including Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, began to use boys to ride the camels in their races.

57. Standard weights were set for the races. The most common customary size limit was 20 kilograms, or 44 pounds. No doubt because of the dangers and hardships involved, the Arab children of Emirati citizens were not used as camel jockeys. Likely because of their small stature, South Asian boys were preferred. Thus, the source for a large percentage of jockeys became, and was known by all participants in the sport to be, the international traffic in children, a traffic that was against the law.

58. The youngest boys, who were smaller than 44 pounds (or 20 kilograms), were also used as slaves. Part of the regular training regimen for young camels was to become accustomed to having a very small boy, perhaps three years old, on his back. Each morning before dawn, as part of this training, older boys riding mature camels would lead several younger boys riding or strapped to young camels on long treks through the desert, returning under the midday sun. Toddler slaves thus proved themselves useful to the camel-training process while also learning to ride so they could later race themselves.

59. Boys who had been trafficked were delivered into the hands of overseers, who worked for the Defendants and who would then exploit them for their labor on behalf of the Defendants. These overseers held the boys, Plaintiffs here, as slaves.

60. Upon information and belief, Defendant Sheikh Hamdan has personally owned hundreds or thousands of racing and breeding camels, and unknown numbers, likely numbering in the several hundreds to over 1000, of such boys enslaved to ride and care for those camels.

61. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan is deeply and personally involved in his camel-racing enterprises, directing and managing in a hands-on manner children trafficked in the slave trade from poor countries, choosing which enslaved child will ride his camels in individual races, personally supervising the overseers who manage the camps where the abducted and enslaved boys and camels live and work, personally giving orders to the enslaved boys, and personally profiting from the boys' labors. His personal and extensive involvement in camel racing is well known. A veterinary consultant to the Maktoum family has stated that "The sport [of camel racing] is alive due to Sheik Mohammed and Sheik Hamdan in this state [Dubai]." Maryjean Wall, *Sport of Sheiks, Monumental Wealth*, Lexington Herald Leader.

62. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan is a well-known hands-on manager in both his camel and horse racing ventures. Speaking of Sheikh Hamdan's hands-on approach to his horse-racing ventures, Kiaran McLaughlin, the trainer of Sheikh Hamdan's Belmont Stakes-winning horse Jazil, stated, "He doesn't have to say it twice. If he says it once, we hear him loud and clear." Tom Pedulla, "Dubai double: Jazil's Belmont win has sheikhs targeting Derby," *USA Today*, June 12, 2006.

63. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan treated his camels better than he treated the slave boys for the simple reason that the camels were far more valuable. Camel prices exceeded \$1 million, while boys could be had for much, much less. Hospitals have been built for the camels, equipped with operating tables that could accommodate humps. The enslaved boys usually did without medical care. The camels ate expensive foods. The boys were given the cheapest foods, and were often starved to keep their weight down.

64. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan and other elite sheikhs exercise great influence in Dubai because of their high social status. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan was part of a leading cabal of sheikhs in the United Arab Emirates whose actions were followed even if they were against the law.

65. Exercising their influence, they have conspired with and aided and abetted others to engage in camel races in which they all agreed, tacitly or explicitly, to flout the law and buy and use as jockeys in races young boys who had been trafficked internationally and delivered to overseers in the United Arab Emirates in order to be enslaved. Defendants through their own actions and the acts of agents, co-conspirators and accomplices, are responsible for the trafficking and enslavement of thousands of boys.

66. In pursuit of their racing business and hobby, Defendants, individually, directly, though agents and in conspiracy with and as accessories to others, purchased boys abducted or sold into slavery and trafficked into the United Arab Emirates, held them as property, and enslaved them to work as camel jockeys. Defendants participated in the slave trade by, *inter alia*, purchasing or leasing and then, when they were finished with them, disposing of slaves by trafficking them in an international slave trade. Further, they engaged in the slave trade by transporting slaves internally within the United Arab Emirates, and by carrying them internationally to other Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states to participate in races. They aided and abetted others engaging and enslaving other children, by, *inter alia*, setting up camel camps and awarding incentives to trainers who worked for them and to the participants in camel races.

67. Defendants directly hired many others to work as camel trainers and overseers for them knowing that these trainers and overseers would enslave boys for them, buy and dispose of boys in the slave trade, and subject the boys to all manner of abuse.

68. The elite sheikhs, including Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, directly encouraged and rewarded others who participated in camel racing and the enslavement of the boys. A primary means for less wealthy individuals to curry favor with the elite sheikhs, and win financial rewards, was to participate in and succeed at camel racing. The elite sheikhs provided the prizes that were primary incentives for others to engage in the sport and enslave boys to do so.

69. In order to hold a race, multiple participants were necessary. As a matter of course and necessity, the riders in a race had to be approximately the same weight. As a matter of tradition and tacit agreement, the boys were not local Arab boys, but non-Arab boys from foreign countries, who could only have been procured in the thousands through the illicit

trafficking in child slaves. Thus, anyone who participated depended on, condoned and contributed to the fact that other individuals were also enslaving child jockeys. Had not they all conspired to use these trafficked, enslaved child jockeys, then individual participants would not have been able to use them for the simple reason that there would have been no one to race against.

70. Every owner who raced a camel ridden by a child jockey knowingly participated in and contributed to the illicit trafficking and enslavement not only of the children that rode and worked for him but also of the children trafficked and enslaved by the other participants in the sport as well. The use of the trafficked and enslaved boys was not an aberration but was the norm.

71. Further, all Defendants created, condoned, owned and maintained a system and network of camps in the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula where the enslaved boys were imprisoned. The camps are isolated, and the Defendants enforced security collectively. A non-Arab boy could not travel down the road from the camel camps into the city without running into one of the Defendants, who would recognize any small South Asian or African boy as an escaping slave, whether it was his slave or not, and return him to his overseer. The majority of the camel camps in the United Arab Emirates were owned and operated by the elite sheikhs of the United Arab Emirates who own all of the land in the desert where the camps are. The sheikhs, including Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, would provide the land, pay fuel and food expenses, pay a monthly salary to overseers, trainers and laborers, and provide equipment such as a four-wheel drive car, a mobile phone, radios, and a water tank truck for the camel camps.

72. While in these camel camps, and at all stages of their trafficking, the boys were exposed to all manners of abuse. The abuses they would suffer have been widely reported, and include the following:

- The boys were sometimes paired with older men who acted ostensibly as a mentor, but who routinely sexually abused them.
- Their food and sleep were limited in order to keep them small enough to race.
- They were sometimes injected with hormones to prevent them from growing.

73. The abuses they suffered were chronicled by the BBC News Online in an article by Lucy Williamson published on February 4, 2005. The article, with a lead photo with the caption “Child jockeys get ready to race in Muscat” provided the following details:

- “Children from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sudan are still being smuggled to the United Arab Emirates to work as camel jockeys, despite a law passed two years ago banning their use.”
- “[Y]oung children can still be seen at racetracks across the UAE, and aid workers estimate there are up to 40,000 working across the Gulf.”
- “Akbar is eight years old, and has spent almost all his life living and working as a camel jockey at a race track in Abu Dhabi.”
- “[T]he boys often arrive [in the refugee center] with broken hands or broken legs. And many ... have been sodomised.”
- “Many boys here remember children at the race tracks being injured. Others like Akbar, remember even worse. ‘There was a child in the camp, and because he wanted to leave the camp and go to Dubai, one of the racetrack owners ran over the child in a truck and killed him,’ he tells me.”
- “Few boys have any idea who their real parents are, or where they come from.”

74. Eventually, foreign governments and international human rights groups began complaining about the fact that there was widespread trafficking in boys abducted from other nations and sold into slavery as camel jockeys and camel camp workers for the sheikhs.

75. The United Arab Emirates passed laws in 1992, in 2002, and again in 2005 mandating minimum age and weight limits in order to combat trafficking in children.

76. For example, on July 22, 2002, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister for Foreign Affairs and also the Chairman of the Emirates Camel Racing Federation,

promulgated Order No.1/6/266, which prohibited children under the age of 15 years old or weighing less than 45 kilograms, or 99 pounds, from being employed in camel racing.

77. However, the Defendants continued to traffic and enslave boys to be used in the races. The limits did little to end the widespread practice that by then had resulted in thousands of small boys in bondage.

78. On occasion, the United Arab Emirates would restate or modify the laws. In practice, the cabal of elite sheikhs who set the *de facto* norms of behavior in the country, the most influential members of which include Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, continued to use enslaved children. Even Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan, who, in his official capacity, promulgated the law ostensibly intended to curb the practice of using child jockeys and thereby combat the slave trade, owned and used enslaved boys in his personal capacity, including Plaintiff A.M. Thus, throughout the country, it was in effect permissible, and in fact necessary, if one were to participate in camel racing, to use enslaved children trafficked from Pakistan, Bangladesh and other nations. As a matter of competitive equality, and as a matter of allegiance to the Maktoums in Dubai, the Nahyans in Abu Dhabi and the other leading families of the various emirates, the practice became to use boys trafficked in the slave trade. All of those who partook in the sport knowingly and necessarily engaged in the practice of slavery and the slave trade and/or conspired with others who openly did so.

79. The story of the active participation of the United Arab Emirates' elite in the trafficking and enslavement of the boys is highlighted by the 2005 Country Report on Human Rights, released March 8, 2006 by the United States Department of State. The Report makes the following points:

- “In October 2004, an in-depth documentary by HBO’s ‘Real Sports’ program detailed the use of young boys as camel jockeys who were subjected to physical abuse and extremely harsh living and working conditions that, at times, led to

serious injuries and death. All of these boys were foreign nationals who had been brought explicitly to work in camel racing. Most of the boys were from Pakistan, Sudan, Bangladesh, or Mauritania.”

- “The trafficking in and abuse of underage camel jockeys persisted during the first several months of the year. In early February, at the Nad al-Sheba racetrack in Dubai, diplomatic representatives witnessed dozens of young foreign boys—some only three years old—still being used to train and race camels. End-of-season camel races on March 9 in Dubai and on March 30 in Abu Dhabi featured underage camel jockeys. Internet reports stated that the race at al-Wathba racetrack in Abu Dhabi was attended by sheikhs and that government security personnel cordoned off the racetrack to prevent foreigners from attending.”

80. For approximately thirteen years, from 1992 to 2005, while the government of the United Arab Emirates was publicly touting the efforts it was making to stem the demand for the slave trade, the aristocracy, including the Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, would meet at camel races and race the camels they owned against each other, and the jockeys that they used in these races were young enslaved trafficking victims from Pakistan, Bangladesh or other countries.

81. The aristocracy fooled their international critics. The United Arab Emirates government passed laws aimed at stopping the slave trade, but the aristocracy engaged in it and thereby made it the standard behavior.

82. After viewing video footage of the squalid camps in which the camel jockeys were held in bondage, Ambassador John R. Miller, Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking In Persons for the United States Department of State, said in the aforementioned HBO *Real Sports* documentary that aired in 2004 that the United States had been “duped”.

83. The named Defendants herein were not only aware of the practice of enslavement and forced child labor, but principal and personal participants in it, whose participation and rapacious demand that their camels run faster paved the way not only for all the lower-ranking members of society to engage in the practice as well, but for a entire system of slavery, complete with overseers, abusers and traffickers to flourish.

## THE TRAFFICKING SYSTEM

84. The Defendants, including Sheikh Hamdan, procured their slaves through a flourishing international trafficking market created as a result of their personal demand for the boys.

85. Overseers and trainers worked at the direction of the sheikhs, including Defendant Sheikh Hamdan.

86. Typically, the overseers, known as *maliks* by the boys, would purchase the boys on behalf of the sheikhs on five- to seven-year contracts from traffickers who had brought them into the United Arab Emirates. The boys were at the mercy of these *maliks*, and others who worked with them.

87. The traffickers sometimes obtained the boys themselves, and sometimes purchased them on the black market in their home countries, or in second countries. The sheikhs only wanted the boys during the years that they could maintain their weight low and be easily controlled. As they approached adolescence, many of the boys would be delivered back to the traffickers, who would take them back to their homelands and dump them at the airport.

88. Penniless orphans, often unable to speak their native language, unschooled and illiterate, having lost all their family connections, alone in a Third World nation, the boys' condition and fate was as sad and desperate as any imaginable.

89. The following story, from the website of the International Labour Organization, illustrates the miserable life of the boys trafficked and enslaved in Dubai:

Shahid from Bangladesh:

Shahid is now 12 years old. He was trafficked when he was only 7 years old. His father died when he was 5. He used to live with his family in Dholaikhal, Jatrabarim where his father earned an income as a truck driver. His father had two wives and Shahid's mother used to work in a garment factory.

"Five years ago one day while I was playing in front of my house, a man came and talked to my stepsister. I later found out that this man was a kidnapper. My stepsister helped the kidnapper to take me away to Dhaka. Later I came to know that my stepsister had sold me to that man.

"In Dhaka, I was kept in a house in the Mirpur area for 4 months. I couldn't go anywhere. While I was there the men arranged my passport. Then we went to India crossing the Comilla border and went further on to Kolkata and to Bombay. In Bombay, I was handed over to two other men. The next night they took me to the airport in Bombay and again handed me over to an Indian lady. The Indian lady and I reached Dubai the following morning, where I was sold to an Arabian man for 30,000 Dinar. The lady was a pimp. The Arabian man brought me to his house and I was engaged as a camel jockey.

"The Arabian master owned a herd of 50-60 race camels. At the beginning my master asked me to look after the camels and also appointed an instructor to train me in camel riding. After going through very strenuous training, I started to work as a camel jockey in the professional camel race. I was not paid for my work but now and then my master used to tip me 100-200 Dinar if the camel won the race. They did not give me very much food to eat, so I was always very hungry. Whenever I asked for some food, they beat me. I only weighed 20 kilo. When I grew a bit older, I was no longer fit for camel jockeying because I could not keep my weight under 20 kilo. I became useless for the Arabian Master, who asked somebody to send me back to Bangladesh.

"Using the same route as when going to the Middle East, the man took me to India and left me near Comilla border in India. While crossing the border into Bangladesh, the border police arrested me and sent me to Camilla jail. I stayed in the jail for one and a half months, and then I finally came to a shelter by the help of a local NGO".

<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipecc/themes/trafficking/casestudy.htm>

### **UAE/UNICEF PROGRAM**

90. In May 2005, an agreement was reached between the government of the United Arab Emirates and UNICEF to return children formerly involved in camel racing to their countries of origin and reintegrate them in their communities.

91. In December 2006, the government of the United Arab Emirates pledged to allocate approximately \$9 million to UNICEF "to assist former camel jockey who have returned home to their communities." See "UAE commits \$9 million to help former camel jockeys," <[http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_37798.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_37798.html)>.

92. In April 2007, the UAE government signed an agreement with UNICEF allocating these funds.

93. Also in April 2007, the UAE government signed four bilateral agreements with the Sudan, Mauritania, Pakistan and Bangladesh outlining plans to establish “administrative boards” in these four countries that would process claims and award damages according to a settlement schedule based on a “liquidated payment amount” of \$1000 for any “qualified claimant who was formerly involved in camel racing.”

94. These “administrative boards” have not been instituted in any of the countries.

95. These “administrative boards” do not assert liability against anyone involved in the enslavement of the former camel jockeys.

96. These “administrative boards” provide no means of asserting claims in an adversarial system against those individuals responsible for the enslavement of the former camel jockeys.

97. The claims of slavery, slave trade, and forced child labor are not claims that may be asserted pursuant to these “administrative boards.”

#### **PLAINTIFFS’ CASE IN FLORIDA**

98. Plaintiffs herein initially filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami on September 7, 2006. *See Mother Doe I, et al. v. Maktoum*, Case No. 06-22253-ALTONAGA/TURNOFF.

99. Upon information and belief, the provision of additional funds to UNICEF by the UAE and the inception of the four bilateral agreements in April 2007 were executed in direct response to the lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs in the Southern District of Florida.

100. That case was dismissed without prejudice on July 30, 2007, on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(2).

**SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS BY REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS**

101. The allegations contained herein regarding the Representative Plaintiffs are typical of those allegations to be asserted by unnamed members of the class as set forth in paragraphs 10 through 23, *supra*.

**O.G.**

102. O.G. was approximately five years old when his mother was approached and offered schooling for him in Dubai in exchange for light housework a few hours a day. She accepted.

103. As soon as O.G. left, however, she realized something was wrong. She was supposed to stay informed about him, but all contact was prohibited. After two years, she learned from the person who had taken her son that he was not going to school and had been sent to work with camels. She had heard stories about how dangerous this was. She was very worried, and so asked that her son be sent back home immediately. She was told that the *malik* who bought O.G. and enslaved him would not allow him to return.

104. Upon information and belief, O.G. was enslaved in a camel camp for Defendant Sheikh Hamdan.

105. O.G. raced in the end-of-year camel races attended by the major sheikhs of the United Arab Emirates.

106. He won one of these races, and after he won, he learned that the camel he was riding was owned by Defendant Sheikh Hamdan. O.G.'s picture was shown alongside of Sheikh Hamdan's picture on the large video monitors announcing the winner of the race.

107. O.G. was trafficked around the Middle East by Defendants. He was traded like chattel amongst various slave masters. They beat him if he did not do what they said.

**R.M.**

108. R.M. was a two-year-old child, alone in his home. He had been left in the care of his older sister while his parents were at work.

109. His sister had put him down for a nap, and gone to a neighbor's house. When she returned, he was gone.

110. For five years, his family had no idea what had happened to him. His parents tried frantically to look for him. They arranged for loudspeakers to be carried throughout the neighborhoods and beyond calling out for their missing toddler. It was unbearable for R.M.'s mother. She finally got to see R.M. again when he turned up, as a seven-year-old, in a shelter home.

111. When R.M. and his mother were finally reunited, they were unable to speak, as they did not speak the same language any more. R.M. did not answer to the name his mother had given him. For, according to the practice of the slave owners of the United Arab Emirates, he had been given an Arabic slave name.

112. While in Dubai, R.M. lived at the camel camp of, and worked for, Defendant Sheikh Hamdan's brother, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates. He rode and cared for the camels owned by Sheikh Mohammed. When the now seven-year-old boy is asked what he did in Dubai for the past five years, he replies, "I worked".

**M.R.**

113. M.R. was approximately five or six years old when a lady he had never previously seen abducted him from a marketplace, and took him through India to Dubai.

114. M.R.'s mother discovered he was missing when she came home from work. She searched for him frantically, and hired loudspeakers to announce that he was lost in a vain attempt to find him. His father, who had been working as a truck driver in Saudi Arabia, returned to his home country to look for his son. He looked for him from town to town on the driving routes in his home country. For six long years, M.R.'s parents thought he might have been kidnapped and murdered, or perhaps had been sold in the slave trade. In fact, he had indeed been sold in the slave trade.

115. M.R. was taken and sold into slavery at a camel camp in Dubai owned by Defendant Sheikh Hamdan's brother, Sheikh Mohammed. His masters gave him a new slave name. There, M.R. met a little boy about two or three years old, the aforementioned R.M. M.R. took R.M. under his wing and watched out for him.

116. Sheikh Mohammed often came to the camp where M.R. and R.M. were enslaved. M.R. saw Sheikh Mohammed there often. Sheikh Mohammed was a hands-on owner in his camel racing enterprise, and often gave instructions to overseers who worked for him, including Saef bin Kaleb (phonetic), who was the overseer at the camel camp where M.R. and R.M. lived and work.

117. The trainers at the camp were notoriously cruel. They would beat M.R. with sticks and with their bare hands if he did not do as they said. They would also beat him if he did, depending on their moods.

118. Early on in his time there, M.R. had naively told Saef bin Kaleb that he had been abducted. Of course Saef bin Kaleb knew that already. The camp was replete with boys who had been abducted and enslaved.

119. M.R. saw many boys injured in the races.

120. M.R. did not attend school.

121. M.R. also saw Defendant Sheikh Hamdan at the races, and raced against his camels, which were ridden by enslaved boys like himself. The boys who belonged to Sheikh Mohammed would sometimes be lent to race for Defendant Sheikh Hamdan.

### A.M.

122. A.M. was approximately six years old when his father was approached and asked if he would like to send his boy to school in the United Arab Emirates. He was told that A.M. would get to live with a wealthy family and would do light housework for a few hours a day in exchange for his housing and schooling.

123. A.M. was a particularly bright and talented boy, so his father hoped that if A.M. could get an education, he could better himself. So, A.M.'s father agreed to send his son to the United Arab Emirates for this educational opportunity, thinking it would be the best thing for him.

124. Once A.M. was in Dubai, his father was not allowed to talk with him again. A.M.'s father asked the man who had arranged for A.M. to go where A.M. was and what had happened to him. The man told A.M.'s father that A.M. was not in school as had been promised, but was working in the camel-racing industry. A.M.'s father demanded that A.M. be sent home immediately. A.M.'s father was told that that would not be possible, as A.M. had been sold on a

5-7 year contract to a *malik*, or master, who was using him for camel racing, and A.M. would have to finish the term of the contract.

125. A.M.'s father had never intended for his son to be sold to work in the dangerous camel-racing industry, wanted him to be in school, and always thought that he would be able to have the boy sent back home if he so chose. Instead, his son had been sold into slavery.

126. A.M.'s master in the United Arab Emirates was Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan, the same Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan who, in 2002, as Chairman of the Emirates Camel Racing Federation, promulgated Order No.1/6/266 on 22 July 2002, which prohibited children under 15 or weighing less than 45 kg from being employed in camel racing. A.M. was obviously less than 15 years old, being between the ages of 6 and 12 when he was in the United Arab Emirates, and weighed less than 45 kilograms. In fact A.M. weighed no more than 20 kilograms, or 44 pounds, during the time that he raced camels for Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan.

127. A.M.'s master, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan, knew that A.M. was a victim of the slave trade.

128. A.M. was put to work exercising, racing and caring for Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan's camels in the camel camps.

129. A.M. proved to be a skilled camel jockey. As such, other sheikhs would frequently want him to ride their camels in races. Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan lent A.M. to other sheikhs.

130. A.M.'s contacts with the sheikhs for whom he raced were routine. They provided him a cellular phone so they could call him to tell him to bring the camels around for training or races.

131. At all times relevant, A.M. was a small boy between the ages of six and twelve, obviously below the age and weight restrictions, and openly a victim of illegal trafficking to the United Arab Emirates. He was being illegally held against the wishes of his parents in the United Arab Emirates, and it was against the law of nations and the laws of the United Arab Emirates for him to be so held in bondage, and against the laws of the United Arab Emirates for him to ride in camel races at all.

132. When A.M. was finally returned to his home country, he was twelve or thirteen years old. He had missed the opportunity to go to school during crucial formative years. The only skill he had learned was how to be a camel jockey, and he was already obsolete for that job. He was too big and too old.

**S.M.**

133. When S.M. was approximately six years old, in or around 1997, he was abducted from his home country, trafficked to the United Arab Emirates, and sold into slavery.

134. He was sold into slavery in a camel camp to exercise, race, and care for camels. His master, or *malik*, was Sheikh Saleh bin Saef (phonetic). S.M. worked long days, waking up at 3 a.m. to start the cycle of feeding, exercising and caring for the camels. He rode for Saleh bin Saef, but sometimes rode for other sheikhs as well.

135. It was dangerous work. S.M. fell and injured his leg badly. While in the United Arab Emirates, he saw two boys killed in camel racing accidents. He was given little food so that he would stay small. He got little sleep.

136. Like all the boys, he was at the mercy of trainers and managers who regularly tortured and abused the boys. Once, to punish him, they burned his shoulder with a hot metal rod. He bears the scars of this torture.

137. S.M. raced camels at major races at which cars were given out as prizes. He raced throughout the United Arab Emirates, in Ras al Khaimah and Al Wathba. His slave name and the name of the camel he was riding were announced on the loudspeaker once, when he won a car for his *malik*. He briefly got to hold the keys to the car, but that was all the payment he received.

138. When he grew too large to race camels, the traffickers took him back to his home country, and abandoned him at the airport.

**COUNT I:**

**PRIMARILY ENGAGING IN SLAVERY OR THE SLAVE TRADE  
IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS**

139. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

140. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan and Defendants Moes 1-500, directly, through agents, and in conspiracy with and as accessories of each other, held the Class Representatives and the Class as a whole as slaves, exercising the rights of ownership over them. Defendants exercised the rights of ownership through widespread tacit arrangements, as masters who have influence because of their social and/or economic status.

141. Defendants' enslavement of Plaintiffs constitutes a crime in violation of the law of nations. The crime of slavery rests on a clear and definite norm of international law that is universally accepted. The prohibitions against slavery are over a century old and have been reiterated and supplemented several times. The prohibition of slavery is defined with a degree of specificity sufficiently comparable to international law violations that were familiar when the Alien Tort Statute was enacted.

142. Slavery is so widely condemned that it has achieved the status of a *jus cogens* violation.

143. In the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1889-90, the signatories declared that they were animated by the firm intention of putting an end to the traffic in African slaves.

144. In the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919, the signatories affirmed their intention of securing the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea.

145. With the 1926 Slavery Convention (“Convention” or “1926 Convention”), concrete rules and articles were decided upon, and slavery and the slave trade were banned. The 1926 Convention entered into force on March 9, 1927. The 1926 Convention both sought to provide more detailed arrangements to give practical effect to the earlier bans and to prevent forced labor from developing into conditions analogous to slavery.

146. On September 7, 1956, the Convention was supplemented with the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (“Supplement”, “Supplementary Convention”). The Supplement entered into force on April 30, 1957. As of February 5, 2002, the Convention was in force among 95 states. *See* <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty3.htm>. The United States was an original signatory to the Convention and acceded to the Supplement on December 6, 1967.

147. The Convention and Supplement are consistent with numerous other sources of international law that reflect the universal condemnation of slavery. Amongst these is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states in Article 4, “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” *See* <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>.

148. The 1956 Supplement's Preamble relates both the rationale and the firm commitment of the international community to abolish slavery and institutions and practices similar to slavery. It states:

Considering that freedom is the birthright of every human being,

Mindful that the peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed in the Charter their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person,

Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and that slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms,

Recognizing that, since the conclusion of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926, which was designed to secure the abolition of slavery and of the slave trade, further progress has been made towards this end,

Having regard to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and to subsequent action by the International Labour Organisation in regard to forced or compulsory labour,

Being aware, however, that slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery have not yet been eliminated in all parts of the world, Having decided, therefore, that the Convention of 1926, which remains operative, should now be augmented by the conclusion of a supplementary convention designed to intensify national as well as international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery . . .

149. The Convention defines slavery as follows: "Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised." The 1956 Supplement, at Article 7, adds that "'slave' means a person in such convention or status".

150. The Slavery Convention, Article 1 and the 1956 Supplement, Article 7, define the slave trade as follows:

"Slave trade" means and includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or

exchanged; and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.

151. The Convention in Article 5 states that the contracting parties undertake “to take all necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labor from developing into conditions analogous to slavery.”

152. The 1956, Supplement, Article 1, particularly addresses the issue of institutions similar to slavery, and called for the abolition of:

(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.

153. Here, the Plaintiffs were delivered to the overseers in the camel camps in order to be exploited or for their labor to be exploited, usually by people who were not their parents or guardians. However, as the Supplement makes clear, anyone who received a child to be exploited or for the child’s labor to be exploited would be violating an international legal norm according to the 1956 Supplement to the Slavery Convention, whether the person delivering the child was the child’s parent, someone posing to be the child’s parent, or anyone else. There simply is no exception to the prohibition on receiving a child with a view to exploiting the child or the child’s labor.

154. Consistent with its condemnation of slavery, the world community has also joined in defining who can be held liable. The Convention and the 1956 Supplement not only outlaw slavery in unequivocal terms, but also explicitly provide for extensive liability, including for inducement, attempt, accessory and conspiracy liability for individuals who in their personal capacity perpetrate slavery. The Convention and Supplement explicitly provide that liability for slavery reaches all individuals that directly or indirectly induce others into slavery, or are an accessory to or in conspiracy with others who do so. Specifically, according to the Convention

and Supplement, liability reaches every accomplice and every person who organizes or directs others in perpetrating slavery.

155. The 1956 Supplement, Article 6, states:

1. The act of enslaving another person *or of inducing another person to give himself or a person dependent upon him into slavery, or of attempting these acts, or being accessory thereto, or being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts*, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.” (emphasis added).

156. Further, Article 6 applies not just to those forcibly enslaved, but even to those induced into slavery, and particularly to children delivered to another person for exploitation as was described in Article 1. It states:

2. Subject to the provisions of the introductory paragraph of article 1 of this Convention, the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present article shall also apply to the act of inducing another person to place himself or a person dependent upon him into the servile status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1, to any attempt to perform such acts, to being accessory thereto, and to being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts.

157. The 1956 Supplement further outlaws both the slave trade and being an accessory to the slave trade. It states:

The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of transport, *or of being accessory thereto*, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties. (emphasis added)

158. Defendants directly perpetrated a violation of international law, to wit, slavery and the slave trade.

159. All Defendants exercised dominion over the enslaved boys through violence and threat of violence. Despite the illegality of their actions, Defendants exercised the rights of ownership over the boys through widespread tacit arrangements made possible by the Defendants’ social and economic status.

160. The exercise of the collective dominion over the enslaved boys was aided by the racial identity of the enslaved individuals. South Asian and African boys were isolated, racially distinct foreigners, without passports, outside of the cities, held in camps from which there was no escape.

161. The law of nations attributes individual liability upon individuals who participate in the slave trade and enslave others such that state action is not required to give rise to liability pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.

162. Plaintiffs and their family members suffered death or serious physical and/or mental injuries as a proximate result of Defendants' conduct in violation of the law of nations' prohibitions against slavery and institutions similar to slavery.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendants and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury arising out of serious physical and/or mental injuries, wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendants from ever again engaging in slavery or the slave trade or practices similar to slavery or the slave trade in violation of the law of nations.

**COUNT II:**

**CONSPIRING TO ENGAGE IN, AIDING AND ABETTING,  
INTENTIONALLY FACILITATING, AND/OR  
RECKLESSLY DISREGARDING SLAVERY OR  
THE SLAVE TRADE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS**

163. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

164. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan, and Moes 1-500 conspired to engage in, aided, abetted, intentionally facilitated, and/or recklessly disregarded the enslavement of and the perpetration of slave trade against the Class members to the detriment of the Class members in violation of the law of nations.

165. As set forth in paragraphs 142 through 157, slavery and the slave trade are defined with a degree of specificity sufficiently comparable to international law violations that were familiar when the Alien Tort Statute was enacted.

166. The Convention and the 1956 Supplement not only outlaw slavery in unequivocal terms, but also explicitly provide for extensive liability, including for inducement, attempt, accessory and conspiracy liability for individuals who in their personal capacity perpetrate slavery. The Convention and Supplement explicitly provide that liability for slavery reaches all individuals that directly or indirectly induce others into slavery, or are an accessory to or in conspiracy with others who do so. Specifically, according to the Convention and Supplement, liability reaches every accomplice and every person who organizes or directs others in perpetrating slavery.

167. The 1956 Supplement, Article 6, states:

*The act of enslaving another person or of inducing another person to give himself or a person dependent upon him into slavery, or of attempting these acts, or being accessory thereto, or being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.*" (emphasis added).

168. Further, Article 6 applies not just to those forcibly enslaved, but even to those induced into slavery, and particularly to children delivered to another person for exploitation as was described in Article 1. It states:

Subject to the provisions of the introductory paragraph of article 1 of this Convention, the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present article shall also apply to

the act of inducing another person to place himself or a person dependent upon him into the servile status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1, to any attempt to perform such acts, to being accessory thereto, and to being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts.

The 1956 Supplement further outlaws both the slave trade and being an accessory to the slave trade. It states: “The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of transport, *or of being accessory thereto*, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties.” (Emphasis added.)

169. Defendants conspired to engage in, aided and abetted, intentionally facilitated, and/or recklessly disregarded a violation of international law, to wit, slavery and the slave trade.

170. The law of nations attributes individual liability upon individuals who enslave others such that state action is not required to give rise to liability pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.

171. Plaintiffs and their family members suffered death or serious physical and/or mental injuries as a proximate result of Defendants’ conduct in violation of the law of nations prohibitions against slavery and institutions similar to slavery.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendants and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury arising out of serious physical and/or mental injuries, wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendants from ever again engaging in slavery or the slave trade or practices similar to slavery or the slave trade in violation of the law of nations.

**COUNT III:**

**PRIMARILY ENGAGING IN OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,  
AIDING AND ABETTING, INTENTIONALLY FACILITATING,  
AND/OR RECKLESSLY DISREGARDING  
FORCED CHILD LABOR  
IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS**

172. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

173. Defendant Sheikh Hamdan and Defendants Moes 1-500 directly, though agents and in conspiracy with and as accessories to others, forced Plaintiffs to provide their labor to them for their private benefit under menace of the penalties of actual and threatened physical and psychological harm. Plaintiffs did not offer their labor voluntarily. Plaintiffs were small boys, as young as two years old when they were forced to provide their labor.

174. Defendants' perpetration of such forced labor constitutes a crime in violation of the law of nations. The crime of forced child labor rests on a clear and definite norm of international law that is universally accepted. The prohibition of forced child labor is defined with a degree of specificity sufficiently comparable to international law violations that were familiar when the Alien Tort Statute was enacted.

175. Forced child labor is so widely condemned that it has achieved the status of a *jus cogens* violation.

176. Various international instruments reflect the prohibition of forced labor. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)III (1948) banned forced labor.

177. The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, U.N.T.S. 280 made forced labor a war crime.

178. In the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Article 4, the signatories agreed that they “shall not permit the imposition of forced or compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals, companies or associations.”

179. Defendants’ exacting of work from Plaintiffs does not fall under any of the exceptions to the prohibition of forced labor in the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (no. 29), Article 2.

180. Exacting of forced labor from the Plaintiffs could not have been allowed under any circumstances as they were minors at all times relevant herein.

181. Defendants’ exacting of forced labor from Plaintiffs was particularly egregious because the Plaintiffs were minors, because they were abducted and trafficked from their home countries, because they were thereby put at risk of and made victims of all manners of abuse, and because there was no countervailing legitimate need for them to be so victimized.

182. That children are a specially protected class is reflected in many international accords. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990) currently has 192 State parties. Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states, “States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”

183. Article 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (entered into force 18 January 2002) further states that “[o]ffering, delivering or accepting, by whatever means, a child for the purpose of ... [e]ngagement of the child in forced labour” is an offense that the criminal or penal law of all contracting parties to the Optional Protocol must encompass.

184. Furthermore, Article 1(d) of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery sought to abolish “Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.”

185. In addition, the Section 103(8) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, enacted as Division A of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.L. 106-386 (Oct. 28, 2000), includes in its definition of “severe forms of trafficking in persons” “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.”

186. Congress further declared this conduct as involving “grave violations of human rights and is a matter of pressing international concern.” Pub.L. 106-386 § 102(b)(23).

187. Defendants directly perpetrated or aided and abetted, intentionally facilitated, and/or recklessly disregarded a violation of international law, to wit, forced child labor.

188. Forced child labor is a modern variant of slavery to which the law of nations attributes individual liability such that state action is not required to give rise to liability under the Alien Tort Statute.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendants and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury arising out of serious physical and/or mental injuries, wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this

Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendants from ever again engaging in forced child labor.

**COUNT IV:**

**BATTERY**

189. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

190. Defendants committed battery against Plaintiffs in furtherance of trafficking in slaves, enslaving them, and in forcing them to provide labor.

191. Defendants intentionally committed acts that resulted in harmful or offensive contact with Plaintiffs' persons. Plaintiffs did not consent to the contact, which caused injury, damage, loss or harm to Plaintiffs.

192. The acts described herein constitute battery, actionable under the laws of Kentucky, the laws of the United States and the laws of the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Pakistan and other nations.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendant and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury for damages arising out of wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendant from ever again aiding and abetting, being accomplices to, conspiring to, participating in a joint venture to, and/or acting with reckless disregard as to a campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations and to prevent the Defendants' committing battery in furtherance of the campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations.

**COUNT V:**

**ASSAULT**

193. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

194. Defendants assaulted Plaintiffs in furtherance of trafficking in slaves, enslaving them, and in forcing them to provide labor.

195. The conduct of Defendants and each of them and Moes 1-500 caused Plaintiffs to be apprehensive that Defendants would subject them to imminent batteries and/or intentional invasions of their rights to be free from offensive and harmful contact, and said conduct demonstrated that Defendants had a present ability to subject Plaintiffs to an immediate, intentional, offensive and harmful touching.

196. The acts described herein constitute assault, actionable under the laws of the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Kentucky, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other nations.

197. **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendant and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury for damages arising out of wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendant from ever again aiding and abetting, being accomplices to, conspiring to, participating in a joint venture to, and/or acting with reckless disregard as to a campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations and to prevent the Defendants' committing assault in furtherance of the campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations.

**COUNT VI:**  
**INTENTIONAL AND/OR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION**  
**OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS**

198. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

199. Defendants knowingly, intentionally and directly engaged in, aided and abetted, intentionally facilitated, and/or recklessly disregarded the enslavement, slave trade, and forced child labor which resulted in the substantial emotional injuries to the Class, including the parents and legal guardians of the boys.

200. Defendants intended or knew or should have known, that their conduct would lead to injury to innocent persons resulting in severe emotional distress. Defendants intended, knew, or should have known that the enslavement, slave trade, and forced child labor would leave family members of the boys devastated, grieving for their loss of their children.

201. The actions of the Defendants were unconscionable and done with an intentional, malicious, willful, and/or reckless disregard for the rights and lives of the boys and their surviving family members.

202. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants' intentional misconduct and/or reckless disregard for human life, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer severe, debilitating, permanent emotional, physical and psychiatric disorders, ongoing emotional distress and anxiety, physical and mental distress, and significant mental injury and impairment causing ongoing and long-term expenses for medical treatment, services, and counseling and long-term care, particularly for all minor Plaintiffs.

203. Defendants, by engaging in this intentional, unlawful conduct, intentionally, grossly negligently, or negligently inflicted emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs.

204. Defendants intended to cause Plaintiffs to suffer emotional distress, or, in the alternative, (a) Defendants engaged in the conduct with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiffs to suffer emotional distress, (b) the Plaintiffs were present at the time the outrageous conduct occurred and (c) the Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs were present.

205. Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress and the outrageous conduct of the Defendants was a cause of the emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs.

206. Defendants' outrageous conduct constitutes the intentional infliction of emotional distress and is actionable under the laws of the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Kentucky, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other nations.

207. **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendant and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury for damages arising out of wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendant from ever again aiding and abetting, being accomplices to, conspiring to, participating in a joint venture to, and/or acting with reckless disregard as to a campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations and to prevent the Defendants' intentionally or negligently inflicting emotional distress in furtherance of the campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations.

#### **COUNT VII:**

#### **WRONGFUL DEATH**

208. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

209. In furtherance of trafficking in slaves, enslaving them, and in forcing them to provide labor, Defendants caused the wrongful death of numerous boys.

210. Plaintiff Father Doe X was the natural father and Plaintiff Mother Doe X was the natural mother of the deceased child John Doe X. Plaintiffs Father Doe X and Mother Doe X are the heirs at law for John Doe X.

211. As a direct result of the Defendants' acts and omissions and as a result of the death of their child John Doe X, Plaintiffs Father Doe X and Mother Doe X have sustained pecuniary loss resulting from loss of society, comfort, attention, services and support of decedent, who was killed while being enslaved.

212. Defendants' actions and omissions were a direct and substantial cause of John Doe X's death. Defendants failed to use due care to protect John Doe X from injury and harm, thereby proximately causing the wrongful death of John Doe X.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendant and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury for damages arising out of wrongful death, loss of consortium, solatium, and/or loss of services, plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendant from ever again aiding and abetting, being accomplices to, conspiring to, participating in a joint venture to, and/or acting with reckless disregard as to a campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations and to prevent the Defendants' causing wrongful deaths concomitant to the campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations.

**COUNT VIII:**

**SURVIVAL**

213. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

214. As a result of the intentional, malicious, reckless, criminal, grossly negligent and negligent acts of the Defendants as described herein, those Plaintiffs who died as a result of the conditions of slavery and forced labor described herein, were placed in a severe, often prolonged, extreme, traumatic, apprehension of harmful, offensive unwarranted bodily contact, injury and assault. Those murdered suffered intensely severe and offensive harmful bodily contact, personal injury and battery; including but not limited to extreme fear, terror, anxiety, emotional and psychological distress, knowledge of impending death and physical and emotional trauma, intentionally inflicted physical pain. Decedents were mentally, physically and emotionally damaged, harmed, trapped, and falsely imprisoned prior to their personal physical injury and deaths.

215. As a result of Defendants' criminal and tortious conduct, those killed suffered damages including pain and suffering, severe trauma, fear, anxiety, permanent physical and emotional distress, ultimate loss of life and life's pleasures, companionship and consortium, loss of family, career, earnings and earning capacity, loss of accretion to their estates, and other immeasurable items of damages to be shown at trial. Plaintiffs herein seek and are entitled to survival damages for those tortured and killed in these suicide bombings and other murderous attacks.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, who are aliens, demand judgment in their favor against Defendant and demand damages in an amount to be determined by a jury for damages arising out of survival plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent Defendant from ever again aiding and abetting, being accomplices to, conspiring to, participating in a joint venture to, and/or acting with reckless disregard as to a campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of

nations and to prevent the Defendants' causing wrongful deaths giving rise to survival claims concomitant to the campaign of slavery, slave trade and/or forced labor in violation of the law of nations.

**COUNT IX:**

**CLASS CERTIFICATION**

216. Paragraphs 1 through 138 hereof are incorporated herein by reference.

217. In specific reference to paragraphs 10 through 16 hereof, Plaintiffs assert that this case should be certified as a class action.

**WHEREFORE**, the Class Representatives and the Class request that this Honorable Court certify this matter as a Class Action and award Plaintiffs damages on each of the causes of action stated above plus interest, costs, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to prevent the Defendants from engaging in the acts giving rise to this Complaint.

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, each and every Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al Maktoum as follows:

- (a) for compensatory damages;
- (b) for punitive damages;
- (c) for costs of suit, attorneys fees and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: September 11, 2007

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